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ABSTRACT. This paper is an examination and evaluation of McDowell’s criticisms of Davidson’s views on concep-
tual schemes and empiricism. I will argue that McDowell does not understand the real nature of Davidson’s 
arguments against the scheme-content dualism and that his new empiricist proposal fails to solve all the 
problems that old empiricism has traditionally raised. This is so because Davidson does not try to reject only 
a certain conception of experience by rejecting the dualism of scheme and content, but a way of thinking 
about meaning and knowledge that assumes a dualism that cannot be maintained. 
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Empiricism has been one of the most important philosophical positions in the history 
of epistemology. From Aristotle to Quine the idea that experience plays a central role 
in the construction of our world view has been widely accepted. Even non-empiricist 
philosophers like Kant have felt the need to accept experience as an external con-
straint for our thoughts. However, in recent years empiricism has received an impor-
tant criticism from the work of Donald Davidson. Davidson denies any justificatory 
role to experience by maintaining that only a belief can play the role of justifying an-
other belief. He achieves this conclusion in the examination of the so-called dualism 
of scheme and content. The conclusion of this examination is that this dualism is a 
dogma of empiricism and if we abandon it we must also give up empiricism because 
this doctrine is only intelligible on the basis of the dualist distinction. On Davidson’s 
view, experience has just a causal role in explaining the acquisition of our beliefs and 
this is the only relevant role it can have in epistemology.  
Among the criticisms Davidson’s conclusion has received, McDowell’s is particu-
larly interesting. This is so because, like Davidson, McDowell rejects the dualism of 
scheme and content but, in spite of this, he defends the view that we can keep the old 
notion of experience, although newly characterised. The difference between Davidson 
and McDowell lies in the reasons for, and the consequences of, the rejection of the 
so-called third dogma of empiricism. In this paper I will examine these disagreements 
and will argue that, though McDowell’s criticism of the scheme-content dualism is 
partially sound, he nevertheless fails to evaluate correctly and completely Davidson’s 
arguments against the scheme-content dualism.  
However, the main philosophical problem is that McDowell thinks, and Davidson 
does not, that there is something important in saving empiricism from the ashes of the 
scheme-content dualism. For McDowell it is not only important, but also necessary to 
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appeal to experience if we want to explain how our thoughts can have content. I think 
that this appeal to experience is unnecessary and we can get the same philosophical re-
sult —to be in touch with reality— from a non-empiricist philosophy such as David-
son’s. More specifically I will defend that the main problem with traditional empiri-
cism is not only that it conceives experience as something extra-conceptual, but also 
the role given to experience as a passive element that keeps us in touch with the 
world. I will finally conclude that McDowell fails to appreciate all the consequences of 
rejecting the dualism of scheme and content. McDowell considers that the dualism is 
just a solution to Kant’s problem about the non-emptiness of our thoughts, although it is in 
fact an assumption for this problem. 
1. McDowell’s rejection of the dualism of scheme and content 
In his book Mind and World and more recently in his article “Scheme-Content Dualism 
and Empiricism” McDowell argues against Davidson’s approach to the scheme-
content dualism, not because McDowell wishes to defend it, but because Davidson 
does not criticize it for the correct reasons and does not draw the correct conclusions 
from its rejection. Before considering McDowell’s arguments against Davidson’s posi-
tion, let us consider McDowell’s own arguments against the scheme-content dualism. 
McDowell’s Mind and World is devoted to the issue of how it is possible that our 
thoughts can represent the world at all. For McDowell this is a pressing and real prob-
lem, a problem that must be resolved. He thinks that in order to answer this question 
we have to re-consider Kant’s position on the problem, especially his idea that our 
knowledge of the external world is possible only because of the cooperation of two 
faculties, receptivity and spontaneity. While receptivity passively provides intuitions, 
through spontaneity our mind freely produces concepts. The Kantian thought that 
McDowell wants to establish is that the freedom of our spontaneity is not absolute and has 
to be constrained by sensibility, that is, the faculty through which we are affected by the 
world. If this did not happen, the idea of being in touch with the world would be out of the 
reach for our thoughts. It is because intuitions yield the material to a system of concepts that 
those concepts can avoid emptiness.  
The scheme-content dualism tries to be an answer to the problem of our freedom 
in producing concepts. According to the dualism, this freedom is restricted, speaking 
in Sellarsians terms, by something Given and unconceptualised, something for which 
we are not responsible at all. McDowell considers that, though the problem that moti-
vates the scheme-content dualism is legitimate, the solution provided by the so-called 
Myth of the Given is erroneous. His main criticism is that the scheme-content dual-
ism, as stated by traditional empiricism, is just incoherent. And it is incoherent because 
one of the members of the dualism, i.e. unconceptualized experience, cannot play the 
role it is supposed to play in the dualism. This role is to restrict the freedom in the 
movements within the scheme, to be a tribunal for the rational elements of the dual-
ism. However, if we conceive of experience as traditional empiricism does, that is, as 
something Given and outside the realm of what Sellars called the space of reasons, experi-
ence cannot do the job precisely for being outside the rational. This is so because 
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If rational relations hold exclusively between elements of schemes, it cannot be the case that what 
it is for something within a scheme to be rationally in good shape, and so worthy of credence, is 
its being related in a certain way to something outside the scheme (McDowell 1999, p. 89). 
McDowell ends by correcting Kant and saying that instead of being blind as the Kant-
ian dictum says, what really happens is that intuitions so conceived are mute.  
McDowell’s criticism is then this: if we distance experience from scheme, limiting 
the rational to the scheme, then experience cannot be used as a tribunal for anything. 
As he says in Mind and World, at best we get exculpations when we wanted justifica-
tions. We cannot be blamed for what happens outside the scheme, but we cannot use 
it in order to be justified in our idea of being in touch with reality. 
This criticism does not mean that the original problem should be abandoned. 
Though the scheme-content dualism is an unstable position, McDowell warns us to be 
careful about what conclusions should be drawn from its rejection. His conclusion is 
that we should give up the idea of experience as something Given, as something extra-
conceptual. But this does not mean for McDowell that we have to give up sensibility 
as a faculty of mind that makes our conceptual scheme answer to the world. As we 
have seen, only through intuitions can our concepts get the possibility of representing 
the world. What we should learn from the abandonment of the scheme-content dual-
ism is that “when we enjoy experience conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptiv-
ity” (McDowell 1994, p. 10). Though experience is passive, our receptivity is operative 
on it.  
At this point it is important to appreciate that McDowell never considers the pos-
sibility that his problem is not a genuine problem. He assumes that there is a problem, a 
real one, the Kantian problem of how is it possible for my thoughts to have the con-
tent they have about an external reality. For McDowell those philosophers such as 
Davidson that do not appeal to experience as an external constraint for our thoughts 
are in the other horn of the Myth of the Given, i.e. coherentism. The real solution to 
the dualism is to achieve a notion of empirical content that cannot be blamed for be-
ing given in the Sellarsian sense. To characterize this content as non conceptual is a 
mistake and McDowell’s own conception will be to consider empirical content as 
something where conceptual capacities are operative. We will examine McDowell’s 
new conception of experience later. Before this, let us consider his criticism of David-
son’s account of the dualism of scheme and content. 
2. McDowell against Davidson’s coherentism 
Before considering McDowell’s criticism of Davidson, I will expound briefly David-
son’s reasons for rejecting empiricism. We can find in Davidson’s work at least two 
different criticisms of empiricism.1 The first one attacks its intelligibility and it is pre-
sented in his article “On the very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (Davidson 1974). 
The conclusion of this article is that we lack criteria for distinguishing between alter-
                                                     
1 There is a third criticism against empiricism considered as a theory of truth and evidence. See Davidson 
(1990). 
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native conceptual schemes and therefore we lack criteria for their identity as well. And 
if we lack a criterion to identify schemes, we lack as well a criterion to distinguish be-
tween a conceptual scheme and its content. Quine famously criticized that this distinc-
tion could be established sentence by sentence, but he thought that it could be coher-
ently stated by distinguishing between a conceptual scheme and its empirical content 
conceived of globally. Davidson’s article shows that we cannot make sense of this dis-
tinction even in that global way. The main target of Davidson’s article is conceptual 
relativism, the idea that there are different conceptual schemes that organize or fit ex-
perience differently, either making people view the world differently, or leading some 
people to consider true what others consider false from their point of view. This has 
as a consequence that conceptual schemes are incommensurable: there is no common 
point of view to judge and compare conceptual schemes. Accordingly, a conceptual 
scheme is its own and only judge with respect to its truth or falsity. 
Davidson’s criticisms of conceptual relativism put in the centre of his attack the 
linguistic counterpart of incommensurable conceptual schemes, i.e. untranslatability. 
Thus, the supposed criterion for distinguishing between conceptual schemes is un-
translatability between the languages associated to the schemes. Davidson shows that 
we cannot make sense of this idea by examining several metaphors and ideas that 
supposedly have as a conclusion complete or partial failures of translation. The impor-
tant point of Davidson’s analysis is that he does not conclude from his rejection of 
conceptual relativism that there is just a conceptual scheme; he does not endorse con-
ceptual monism. His conclusion is not that all mankind possess the same conceptual 
scheme because “if we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither can 
we intelligibly say that they are one” (Davidson 1974, p. 198). As we cannot intelligibly 
say that there are different conceptual schemes, we must provide criteria to identify 
both conceptual schemes and their content in order to defend that all humans share 
an identical conceptual scheme. In the absence of those criteria the distinction between a 
conceptual scheme and its content is just a dogmatic one and those conceptions that, like 
empiricism, are grounded on that distinction could simply be considered unwarranted.  
The second criticism we can find in Davidson’s work consists in his claiming that 
only a belief can justify another belief. According to Davidson neither experiences nor 
sensations can perform the task of justifying a belief. This criticism, though already 
stated in “On the very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, has been more clearly devel-
oped in other articles, particularly in “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” 
(Davidson 1986). Its main target is foundationalist theories of knowledge that seek an 
epistemological base for the rest of our knowledge of the world. Among the candi-
dates to perform the task of grounding knowledge experience is the most brilliant 
candidate. However, Davidson denies that experience, at least conceived as something 
extrajudgemental, can serve as justification for beliefs and defends the view that the 
only property we can guarantee to our beliefs is their coherence with other beliefs. We 
will examine more carefully this claim in the third and fourth sections of this paper. 
What is important to realize at this point is that Davidson provides, at least, two criti-
cisms directed against empiricism. This is important because McDowell never consid-
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ers properly Davidson’s first criticism in “On the very idea of a Conceptual Scheme” 
and concentrates on the second one. Of course, the second criticism is independent 
from the first one and it can be defended independently as well. However, it only ac-
quires its real force in the light of the first criticism. If we forget its existence, as 
McDowell does, it is very easy to misunderstand the real meaning of Davidson’s rejec-
tion of empiricism.  
Though McDowell agrees with Davidson’s rejection of the scheme-content dual-
ism, he thinks that Davidson’s rejection of empiricism simply does not follow. His 
main criticism is that Davidson does not recognize the real root of the problem and 
this misconception makes him draw the wrong conclusions. According to McDowell 
(1999), Davidson considers that the main reason for adopting the dualism of scheme 
and content is to guarantee the authority of the subject on his own mental states in 
order to save subjectivity from the sceptic’s hands. McDowell considers that this is a 
mistake. He offers the example of Quine’s philosophy in order to show Davidson’s 
error. He agrees with Davidson that Quine can be accused of holding the dualism of 
scheme and content. However, Quine cannot be accused of internalising experience as 
an epistemological barrier against the sceptic. If we examine carefully Quine’s reasons 
for empiricism, we discover that his aim is to show “the extent of man’s sovereignty” 
(Quine 1960, p. 5), not to transform experience into something subjective. This is so, 
according to McDowell, because the real root of the scheme-content dualism, of the 
Myth of the Given, is not “an anxiety about our entitlement to our world view” 
(McDowell 1999, p. 93) as Davidson considers, but “an interest in the conditions of 
its being intelligible that we have a world view” (McDowell 1999, p. 95). The idea that 
motivates the scheme-content dualism is that it would be impossible to have any rep-
resentation of the world if, in Kantian terms, the freedom of our spontaneity —our 
capacity of producing concepts— were not constrained from outside. Therefore, the 
real root of the scheme-content dualism is then not a subjectivation of evidence, but 
the mere possibility of having representations of the world. From this consideration it 
is easy to see why McDowell sees that the main problem in the scheme-content dual-
ism is the characterization of experience as something unconceptualised. If experience 
has to restrict the freedom of movements within the scheme, it must have a concep-
tual character to be able to mediate between the scheme and the world.  
Davidson misses the point when he rejects experience as an element of epistemo-
logical importance. McDowell thinks that to abandon experience as a constraint on 
our system of concepts is to lose the very possibility of having representational con-
tent at all. McDowell writes that  
Davidson is immune to any anxiety about how it is possible that there are world views at all… 
There is no real question whether world views are about the external world. But this leaves it 
open that entitlement to this absence of worry may depend on accepting the core thesis of em-
piricism. If that is so, then someone who rejects empiricism, like Davidson, thereby deprives 
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himself of the right to his immunity over the non-emptiness of thoughts (McDowell 1999, p. 
97).2
Thus, if we do not grant experience an epistemological role, then we cannot explain 
how it is possible to have representational content at all. McDowell attributes this 
false immunity to Davidson because of his coherentism. McDowell quotes Davidson 
dictum that “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief” 
(Davidson 1986, p. 310). Coherentism for McDowell is just the other horn of the 
Myth of the Given: there can be no rational constraint from outside. For McDowell this is 
“disastrous: it ensures that we cannot refuse to find a mystery in the bearing of belief, or any-
thing else, for instance appearing, on the empirical world” (McDowell 1984, p. 144).  
We can summarize this section by saying that, according to McDowell, Davidson’s 
criticisms of the idea of a conceptual scheme fails to recognize the real nature of the 
problem and because of this Davidson draws the wrong conclusions, as is the case 
with his rejection of experience as a justificatory element for our beliefs. This rejection 
implies abandoning the very possibility of being in touch with the world, of being able 
to have a picture of it. This is shown in Davidson’s adherence to coherentism, insofar 
as there is no constraint to the freedom of our spontaneity. However, McDowell’s ac-
count of knowledge and experience has yet to face several problems. Is he right in his 
criticism to Davidson? Do we need experience with us to account for the justification 
of our beliefs? And, even if the answer to these questions is positive, does McDowell’s 
own conception of experience solve the problem he wishes to address? 
3. A defence of Davidson 
McDowell’s main accusation against Davidson is that he leaves our thoughts, consid-
ered as a body of beliefs, devoid of empirical content because of his adherence to co-
herentism, a coherentism genuinely unconstrained. Our beliefs do not answer to the 
world because experience is excluded from the Davidsonian account of thought. 
Davidson leaves no place for experience in the space of reasons (what McDowell calls 
appearings). McDowell says that “Davidson does not talk about appearings, and he 
writes as if only beliefs can fill the role that I have suggested appearings can fill”. 
McDowell adds that “he could have made the same substantial point if he had said: 
nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except something else that is also in 
the space of concepts” (McDowell 1984, p. 140).  
I will argue below that McDowell’s new empiricism fails to solve all the difficulties 
that old empiricism had raised. Before examining McDowell’s own position on ex-
perience and its problems, I would like to defend Davidson’s views on meaning and 
belief from McDowell’s attack. In order to clarify the controversy, it is important to 
appreciate some differences between McDowell and Davidson’s approaches to the 
problem. As McDowell (1999, pp. 90-91) correctly realizes, whereas he speaks in 
Kantian terms when examining the dualism of scheme and content, Davidson speaks 
                                                     
2 Davidson accepts ironically this immunity in his answer to McDowell (2001). See Davidson 2001, p. 288-
89.  
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of world views and this term presupposes the existence of a body of beliefs. As R.F. 
Gibson has observed (Gibson 1999, p. 130), this fact makes both approaches to be 
likely incommensurable. This is so because while we can speak in a Kantian vein con-
sistently of a system of concepts empty of empirical content, it makes no sense to 
speak in the same terms of beliefs. A belief is a propositional attitude whose content is 
stated by a proposition and it makes no sense to speak of an empty system of beliefs. 
McDowell fails to appreciate sufficiently this fact. McDowell would be right in his 
criticism if Davidson’s coherentism were restricted to a system of concepts that would 
be empty by definition. But if Davidson talks, as he does, in terms of beliefs, it is not 
clear that McDowell criticism could be applied to him. Of course, given that proposi-
tions state the content of beliefs and are constituted by concepts, Davidson could be 
accused of not considering or not having an answer to Kant’s problem about the in-
teraction between receptivity and sensibility. But this is so because, for Davidson, 
Kant’s problem needs for its very intelligibility the dualism of scheme and content, a 
dualism that for him is untenable insofar as a criterion for the identity for the two mem-
bers is provided, a criterion that McDowell does not provide. If we could make sense of a 
conceptual scheme and its content, then we would have the problem about whether and 
how they interact. However, if cannot make sense of the distinction, the problem does not 
arise and accusing Davidson of leaving thought devoid of empirical content presupposes 
the legitimacy of a problem that it is far from clear.  
Davidson never poses himself the question as how it is possible for our concepts 
to have content, at least in term of an individual’s mental capacities.3 For him, it is a 
fact that words have meaning and that beliefs have content, and the important ques-
tion is how we determine the meaning of words and the content of beliefs. In the 
Davidsonian account of belief and meaning, a belief gets its representational content 
in the process of radical interpretation. For Davidson a human being subject to inter-
pretation has mental states such as beliefs and desires, to the effect that we can explain 
her verbal behaviour with the help of those concepts. As Davidson says, beliefs and 
meanings conspire in accounting for verbal behaviour. In radical interpretation we 
have to interpret the behaviour of somebody whose meanings and beliefs we ignore. 
Davidson’s well known conclusion says that the only way to understand a person in 
such a case is to apply the principle of charity across the board, i.e. to assume that her be-
liefs about the world are mostly true and that we have to interpret her, at least in the 
first stages, as if she were right about how the world is. 
                                                     
3 Davidson tries to give an answer to the problem of how thought is possible, but not in terms of mental 
capacities as McDowell does. He assumes the problem in linguistic terms and maintains that language 
is possible due to the existence of two things. The first one is triangulation, a natural process shared 
with other animals in which two beings recognize each other reaction to the environment. Neverthe-
less triangulation is not enough to explain thought and language. To have thoughts implies the pos-
session of the concept of truth and only a social environment makes room for the existence of this 
concept. We can say that the lines of the triangle must be implemented by social control to make 
sense of the idea of someone being wrong about something, or simply being surprised. As Brandom 
has pointed out (Brandom 1998), a residual individualism makes McDowell underestimate the signifi-
cance of this social aspect of thought. 
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For Davidson, McDowell’s Kantian problem is not a problem at all. It is a problem 
only if we presuppose a philosophical background that we are not forced to accept. 
More specifically it needs the acceptance of the dualist distinction between a concep-
tual realm and its empirical content. Of course, if there were a system of concepts de-
void of empirical content or a capacity of generating such a system and, a natural 
world waiting to be organized and known, then there would be a problem about how 
our concepts can apprehend the world. In that case we would need an epistemological 
intermediary that connects mind and nature. But in the Davidsonian approach we do 
not need to answer this problem, because it is a false problem. And it is a false prob-
lem because it assumes a distinction we lack a criterion for. Instead of accepting the 
Kantian framework, Davidson offers a new approach based on the case of radical in-
terpretation. In radical interpretation we work at the level of beliefs and sentences, not 
at the level of concepts. The content of beliefs and sentences is determined through a 
process of triangulation and once this content is determined there is not a further 
question about how can a belief or a sentence represent the world. The content of 
what Davidson calls basic perceptual beliefs is the circumstances the belief is about 
and there is no need of any additional question about the interaction between the con-
ceptual and the empirical in order to explain this fact. Our senses have a fundamental 
role in the acquisition of information about the world, but this role is not epistemo-
logical, it is causal. 
Davidson offers what we might call an alternative rather than a solution to the Kant-
ian problem of the interaction between spontaneity and receptivity. Instead of assum-
ing a philosophical background and trying to resolve its inherent problems, Davidson 
avoids those problems by declaring them false problems based on unjustified assump-
tions. This is, in my opinion, the only way out for the problems stated by the Kantian 
framework that McDowell assumes. As we will see, once this framework is accepted, 
no notion of experience can fill the role of restricting the freedom of spontaneity, in-
cluding McDowell’s appearings. Of course, we must acknowledge that McDowell’s 
conception of experience avoids important problems other conceptions face, but it 
does not overcome all of them. However, although I think that we can cast doubts on 
the need for, and the existence of, McDowell’s appearings, there is one more crucial 
problem that McDowell’s appearings have to face: even if they are admitted in the 
epistemological theatre, they cannot have the justificatory role they are supposed to 
perform.  
4. Looking for a place for experience 
McDowell does not think that we have to give up experience in abandoning the 
scheme-content dualism. This is so because the real problem with this dualism was a 
conception of experience as something Given, external to the conceptual sphere. If 
we conceive it as something that has conceptual content, then experience can fill the 
role Kant thought it could fill: restricting the freedom of our spontaneity. As we saw, 
experience so conceived could give us justifications where traditional empiricism only 
gave exculpations. Thus McDowell introduces a new element in the epistemological 
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theatre, what he calls appearings. Appearings have the role of presenting the world to 
the mind and they are described as an openness to reality.4 Appearings have conceptual 
content and this content can be also the content of a belief. For McDowell the differ-
ence between appearings and beliefs is that in appearings we are merely passive, we 
take in that things are so and so, and in beliefs we judge that things are so and so. He 
describes them as invitations to belief (McDowell 2001a, p. 278). Though McDowell 
recognizes a close relationship between appearings and beliefs because we usually be-
lieve what it appears to us, he says that “it is not obvious that the appearing is the be-
lief” and that we can innocuously credit the appearing with rational implications for 
what we ought to think (McDowell 1984, p. 140). In normal cases the appearing will 
be a reason for believing that things are thus and so, but it must be possible, on 
McDowell’s view minimally “to decide whether or not that things are as one’s experi-
ence represents them to be” (McDowell 1984, p. 11).  
A first difficulty with McDowell’s proposal is whether we conceive of experience 
in our common practice of justifying beliefs as something exempt from judgment. As 
Barry Stroud (2001) has pointed out, McDowell is right when he affirms that experi-
ence usually serves in daily life as a reason for believing something. But this common 
notion of experience is not neutral from the point of view of judgment. Stroud con-
centrates on the case of seeing something. When we affirm, for instance, that we see a 
blue car, we are compromised with the truth that that car is that colour. We do not see 
the car and then judge what colour it is. There is not a previous invitation to believe on 
the part of experience. To see something, to hear something, can be a reason for be-
lieving something, but not because experience is something more fundamental or neu-
tral from the point of view of judgment, but because an element of belief is involved 
in it. 
I think that Stroud is right in his views on perception and that it involves judgment 
as well as conceptual capacities. In spite of this, McDowell has offered examples that, 
in his opinion, show that we can find in our language uses of seeing that imply the ex-
istence of his appearings. These are cases of illusions or errors. McDowell considers 
the Müller-Lyer illusion as an example on behalf of his position (McDowell 1984, p. 
11). In this kind of illusion it seems that we can say that we see two lines as unequally 
long but that once we know they have the same length we refrain from judging that 
things are as experience presents them to be. We are invited by perception to judge 
them as unequally long, but we do not accept what it presents to us. It seems that in 
this kind of cases we can distinguish between the act of seeing something, where we 
are merely passive, and the act of judging, where we decide to accept or not the truth 
of what has been seen. While the first mental act produces appearings, the second one 
produces beliefs and it is based on the presence of appearings. 
In my opinion cases of illusion as the one considered do not force us to accept 
McDowell’s appearances. In the case we have just described, we can interpret the act 
                                                     
4 Contrary to Humean ideas, appearings are not epistemological intermediaries to base our judgments on. 
It is their content what is judged as true or false, not the impression itself. 
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of seeing in terms of belief by saying that we once saw them as unequally long and we 
believed that both lines were not equally long, but now we have measured them and 
we believe them to be exactly the same length. The question is: once we know they are 
identical, do we continue seeing them different? Or better: do we continue affirming 
that we see them unequally long but we believe that they are identical? I do not think 
so. In cases of illusion we do not speak in terms of seeing something, we are not 
forced to say that we see them as unequally long; it is much more natural to say that 
they seem to be different, but that they are not. The change in the use of the verb is not 
casual. We use “seem” instead of “see” precisely because to see something naturally 
involves an element of acceptance that our knowledge of the case prevents us from 
considering the illusion as a normal case of seeing. We use “seem” precisely to advise 
someone that she faces a case where the usual reliability of the senses cannot be 
trusted. What this kind of example really shows is just that we have to accommodate 
our perceptual beliefs in a wider body of beliefs and that further evidence can make us 
reject some of the beliefs we had previously accepted.5 In any case, and regardless of 
whether these cases are sufficiently representative of perception in general, what they 
do not show is that it is compulsory to accept a new epistemological element in the 
epistemological theatre.6
McDowell offers other examples to show that we can find in our language uses of 
seeing that involve his notion of passive conceptualised experience.7 I think that all 
those examples can be interpreted as involving an element of belief. Nevertheless, the 
main objection against his position does not depend on this point. Let’s concede for 
the sake of the argument that it is true that these examples really show the need of ap-
pearings to explain cases of illusion or error and that these cases can be extended to 
veridical experiences as well. Accepting all this, do appearings solve the problem of 
justification? Do they serve as the foundation empirical knowledge needs on McDow-
ell’s opinion? I do not think so. Even if we conceded that appearings exist and are 
neutral from the point of view of judgment, it is not clear that, in McDowell’s own 
                                                     
5 It could be thought that my use of “seem” in cases of illusion is just a way of endorsing McDowell’s 
view by merely changing terminology. I do not think so. If our ordinary use of the verb “seem” could 
only be explained by appealing to a kind of perception devoid of judgment, then McDowell would be 
justified in affirming the existence of appearings. However our ordinary use presupposes that seeing 
something is an activity that involves judgment. When someone advises us that something seems or 
looks in a certain way, what he is saying is that we should change our judgment, or that we should 
suspend judgment because there is additional relevant information to be taken into account about the 
case. But we change or suspend judgment because there is judgment. What it does not follow is that 
we have to admit among us a new epistemological element —appearings— to account for cases of 
illusions. 
6 Gibson —in Gibson 1999, p. 133— points out another difficulty for McDowell’s account for illusions. 
If we “take in” an aspect of the world when we have a veridical appearance, what happens when we 
are misled as in the case of illusions? Do we take in an aspect of the world? Or is it merely an appear-
ance? What is the difference between them? It could be said that in both cases (non-misleading and 
misleading experiences) what is “taken in” is appearances. But this idealist conclusion should not be 
drawn for a philosophy that wishes to keep us in touch with reality. 
7 See for instance his answer to Stroud (McDowell 2001a, p. 277-8). 
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terms, they would offer justifications instead of mere exculpations. We saw that on 
McDowell’s opinion the traditional conception of experience only gave us exculpation 
where we needed justifications and this was so because experience was conceived of 
as something non-conceptual. The question is: is conceptualisation enough for experi-
ence to become a justificatory element of belief? The answer must be negative. 
McDowell’s conception of experience suffers the same problem he attributes to tradi-
tional empiricism: it can only give us exculpations —invitations?, but not justifica-
tions. Experience could serve as a justification for believing something only if what is 
experienced is also believed by the subject, if the appearing transforms into a belief. 
This is Davidson’s main point when he affirms that only a belief can justify another 
belief. The problem with the Given is precisely that it is given, but not taken. That is, 
the subject has not judged it as true or false and therefore it cannot take it as a reason 
for anything. If appearings were taken in as McDowell claims, they would transform 
immediately into a belief. An appearing cannot justify anything if there is not an ac-
ceptance of the content of the appearing. Davidson has expressed this idea in this 
way: 
I do not understand how a propositional attitude which is totally devoid of an element of belief 
can serve as a reason for anything. We take it in, he says. If this means we know what we have 
taken it in, then we must believe that we have taken it in, and this belief can be a reason. But an 
attitude that carries no conviction would be inert (Davidson 2001, p. 290).8
Appearings are not, contrary to what Rorty has pointed out (Rorty 1998, p. 289), 
“foundational beliefs”. If they were, they could be used as justifications for other be-
liefs and the problem would be whether they have a foundational role. Rorty is right in 
considering that appearings have a foundational role in McDowell’s epistemology, but 
once this is admitted it is necessary to say that appearings are not beliefs. Appearings 
are a new kind of propositional attitude, a passive one neutral from the point of view 
of judgment. Their supposed virtue is being a hybrid of reason and nature: conceptual 
capacities are involved in them, but they are given by nature. This is why their passiv-
ity is so important for McDowell. But the passiveness that seems to constitute the vir-
tue of appearings makes them useless to solve the problem of justification. The prob-
lem with traditional empiricism is not only that it conceives experience as something 
unconceptualised, but also that the subject is not committed to the truth of what ex-
perience represents. Appearings cannot be a reason for anything if there is no com-
mitment to the truth of what they present. Thus, if appearings do not become beliefs 
they cannot serve as reasons for holding other beliefs. And if they become beliefs they 
lose their role of being given by nature and of restricting the freedom of spontaneity. 
McDowell new dress for experience makes it to look better, but this is not enough: appear-
ings solve the problem of conceptualisation, but they are as much in the grip of the dogma 
of passiveness as old empiricism was. 
                                                     
8 Davidson stresses the same point in his answer to McDowell’s comments on his book Subjective, Intersub-
jective, Objective. See Davidson 2003, p. 695-6. 
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5. Conceptual schemes again 
I think that these last remarks have important consequences for the discussion of the 
dualism of scheme and content. The dualism of scheme and content is not, as 
McDowell defends, only a solution for the Kantian problem of how can our concepts 
represent the world. It is not just a failure of a certain conception of experience. The 
dualism of scheme and content is an assumption for the very intelligibility of Kant’s 
problem. Only if we consider that we can distinguish clearly between two different 
kinds of things, the conceptual and the empirical, can we make sense of the problem 
of how concepts can have content at all. Kant’s problem about the non-emptiness of 
our thoughts only makes sense if we presuppose this distinction. But the problem is, 
as Davidson showed in “On the Very Idea of a conceptual Scheme”, that a distinction 
of this kind is not available because we lack of criteria to distinguish between the con-
ceptual and the empirical elements of our thoughts. Moreover, once that this distinc-
tion is admitted, no answer can satisfy Kant’s exigencies: it becomes an unsolvable 
problem. Empiricism cannot be an answer to that problem, neither can McDowell’s 
empiricism, because no notion of experience can do what empiricists wish it to do: on 
the one hand, to be given in the sense that we are not responsible at all about what is 
presented to the mind; on the other hand, to be a justificatory element for our 
thoughts. Empiricists must face at this point a tragic dilemma: either they conceive of 
experience as something given but of no use for epistemological matters, or experi-
ence is conceived of as a full member of the realm of thought and then it loses its ca-
pacity to answer the Kantian problem about the non-emptiness of thought. And if it 
loses this capacity, it is not clear that it remains something that deserves to be called 
empiricism. 
The only way of giving a solution to McDowell’s Kantian problem is to deny, as 
Davidson does, the intelligibility of the dualism it is based on: the dualism of scheme 
and content. This means to declare it a false problem based on distinctions and phi-
losophical doctrines that, when examined, reveal themselves as unintelligible. Kant’s 
problem cannot be solved, but it can be avoided. This is what McDowell’s missed, and 
what Davidson saw. Davidson is on the right side of the debate, because his position 
has shown us how to dissolve the Kantian problem of the relationship between mind 
and world, between a system of concepts and experience, instead of keeping it alive 
with a new answer condemned to failure. We can be in touch with the world without 
the friendship of an intermediary that can be repudiated as useless, and that always 
threatens us with what it promises to be a warrant against: contact with the real world. 
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